Introduction

What Is Fraud?
Fraud is a worldwide phenomenon that affects all conti-nents and all sectors of the economy. Fraud encompasses a wide-range of illicit practices and illegal acts involving intentional deception, or misrepresentation. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), fraud is "a deception or misrepresentation that an indi-vidual or entity makes knowing that misrepresentation could result in some unauthorized benefit to the individ-ual or to the entity or some other party" [1] . In other words, mistakes are not fraud. Indeed, in fraud, groups of unscrupulous individuals manipulate, or influence the activities of a target business with the intention of mak-ing money, or obtaining goods through illegal or unfair means. Fraud cheats the target organization of its legiti-mate income and results in a loss of goods, money, and even goodwill and reputation. Fraud often employs ille-gal and immoral, or unfair means. It is essential that organizations build processes, procedures and controls that do not needlessly put employees in a position to commit fraud and that effectively detect fraudulent activity if it occurs. The fraud involving persons from the leadership level is known under the name "managerial fraud" and the one involving only entity's employees is named "fraud by employees' association".
Magnitude of Fraud Losses: A Glimpse
Organizations of all types and sizes are subject to fraud. On a number of occasions over the past few decades, major public companies have experienced financial reporting fraud, resulting in turmoil in the capital markets, a loss of shareholder value, and, in some cases, the bankruptcy of the company itself. Although, it is gener-ally accepted that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has improved corporate governance and decreased the incidence of fraud, recent studies and surveys indicate that investors and management continue to have concerns about finan-cial statement fraud. For example:
The ACFE's "2010 Report to the Nations on Occupa-tional Fraud and Abuse" [1] found that financial statement fraud, while representing less than five percent of the cases of fraud in its report, was by far the most costly, with a median loss of $1.7 million per incident. Survey participants estimated that the typical organization loses 5% of its revenues to fraud each year. Applied to the 2011 Gross World Product, this figure translates to a potential projected annual fraud loss of more than $3.5 trillion. The median loss caused by the occupational fraud cases in our study was $140,000. More than one-fifth of these cases caused losses of at least $1 million. The frauds re-ported to us lasted a median of 18 months before be-ing detected. "Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998 -2007 , from the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (the 2010 COSO Fraud Re-port) [2] , analyzed 347 frauds investigated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 1998 to 2007 and found that the median dollar amount of each instance of fraud had increased three times from the level in a similar 1999 study, from a median of $4.1 million in the 1999 study to $12 mil-lion. In addition, the median size of the company involved in fraudulent financial reporting increased ap-proximately six-fold, from $16 million to $93 million in total assets and from $13 million to $72 million in revenues.
A "2009 KPMG Survey" [3] of 204 executives of US companies with annual revenues of $250 million or more found that 65 percent of the respondents con-sidered fraud to be a significant risk to their organiza-tions in the next year, and more than onethird of those identified financial reporting fraud as one of the highest risks.
Fifty-six percent of the approximately 2100 business professionals surveyed during a "Deloitte Forensic Center" [4] webcast about reducing fraud risk pre-dicted that more financial statement fraud would be uncovered in 2010 and 2011 as compared to the pre-vious three years. Almost half of those surveyed (46 percent) pointed to the recession as the reason for this increase.
According to "Annual Fraud Indicator 2012" con-ducted by the National Fraud Authority (UK) [5] , "The scale of fraud losses in 2012, against all victims in the UK, is in the region of £73 billion per annum. In 2006 In , 2010 In and 2011 . The 2012 estimate is significantly greater than the previous figures because it includes new and improved estimates in a number of areas, in particular against the private sector. Fraud harms all areas of the UK economy". Moreover, financial statement fraud was a contributing factor to the recent financial crisis and it threatened the efficiency, liquidity and safety of both debt and capital markets [6] . Furthermore, it has significantly increased uncertainty and volatility in financial markets, shaking investor confidence worldwide. It also reduces the cred-itability of financial information that investors use in investment decisions. When taking into account the loss of investor confidence, as well as, reputational damage and potential fines and criminal actions, it is clear why financial misstatements should be every manager's worst fraudrelated nightmare [7] .
Who Commits Frauds?
Everyday, there are revelations of organizations behaving in discreditable ways [8] . Generally, there are three groups of business people who commit financial state-ment frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid-and lower-level management and organ-izational criminals [9] . CEOs and CFOs commit ac-counting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain per-sonal income and wealth. Mid-and lower-level employ-yees falsify financial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial sta-tements to obtain loans, or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a "pump-and-dump" scheme. While many chan-ges in financial audit processes have stemmed from fi-nancial fraud, or manipulations, history and related re-search repeatedly demonstrates that a financial audit simply cannot be relied upon to detect fraud at any significant level.
Consequences of Fraudulent Reporting
Fraudulent financial reporting can have significant con-sequences for the organization and its stakeholders, as well as for public confidence in the capital markets. Pe-riodic highprofile cases of fraudulent financial reporting also raise concerns about the credibility of the US fi-nancial reporting process and call into question the roles of management, auditors, regulators, and analysts, among others. Moreover, corporate fraud impacts organizations in several areas: financial, operational and psychological [10] . While the monetary loss owing to fraud is signifi-cant, the full impact of fraud on an organization can be staggering. In fact, the losses to reputation, goodwill, and customer relations can be devastating. When fraudulent financial reporting occurs, serious consequences ensue. The damage that result is also widespread, with a some-times devastating "ripple" effect [6] . Those affected may range from the "immediate" victims (the company's stockholders and creditors) to the more "remote" (those harmed when investor confidence in the stock market is shaken). Between these two extremes, many others may be affected: "employees" who suffer job loss or dimin-ished pension fund value; "depositors" in financial insti-tutions; the company's "underwriters, auditors, attorneys, and insurers"; and even honest "competitors" whose reputations suffer by association.
As fraud can be perpetrated by any employee within an organization or by those from the outside, therefore, it is important to have an effective "fraud management" program in place to safeguard your organization's assets and reputation. Thus, prevention and earlier detection of fraudulent financial reporting must start with the entity that prepares financial reports. Given the current state of the economy and recent corporate scandals, fraud is still a top concern for corporate executives. In fact, the sweeping regulations of Sarbanes-Oxley, designed to help prevent and detect corporate fraud, have exposed fraudulent practices that previously may have gone un-detected. Additionally, more corporate executives are paying fines and serving prison time than ever before. No industry is immune to fraudulent situations and the nega-tive publicity that swirls around them. The implications for management are clear: every organization is vulner-able to fraud, and managers must know how to detect it, or at least, when to suspect it. [21] examined the reasons for "check" frauds, the magnitude of frauds in Indian banks, and the manner, in which the expertise of internal auditors can be integrated, in order to detect and prevent frauds in banks by taking "proactive" steps to combat frauds. Chen [22] in his study examined "unethical" lead-ership in the companies and compares the role of unethi-cal leaders in a variety of scenarios. Through the use of computer simulation models, he shows how a combina-tion of CEO's narcissism, financial incentive, sharehold-ers' expectations and subordinate silence as well as CEO's dishonesty can do much to explain some of the findings highlighted in recent high-profile financial accounting scandals. According to a research study performed by Cecchini et al. [23] , the authors provided a methodology for detecting "management" fraud using basic financial data based on "support vector machines". From the above, it is evident that majority of studies were performed in developed, Western countries. However, the manager's behavior in fraud commitment has been relatively unexplored so far. Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to examine managers' unethical behaviors in Satyam Computer Limited, which constitute an ex-post evaluation of alleged or acknowledged fraud case. Unfortunately, no study has been conducted to ex-amine behavioral aspects of manager's in the perpetua-tion of corporate frauds in the context of a developing economy, like India. Hence, the present study seeks to fill this gap and contributes to the literature.
Review of Literature
Research Methodology, Objectives and Sources of Information
Financial reporting practice can be developed by refer-ence to a particular setting in which it is embedded. Therefore, "qualitative" research could be seen useful to explore and describe fraudulent financial reporting prac-tice. Here, two issues are crucial. First, to understand why and how a "specific" company is committed to fraudulent financial reporting practice an appropriate "interpretive" research approach is needed. Second, case study con-ducted as part of this study, looked specifically at the largest fraud case in India, involving Satyam Computer Services (Satyam). Labelled as "India's Enron" by the Indian media, the Satyam accounting fraud has compre-hensively exposed the failure of the regulatory oversight mechanism in India. No doubt, to design better accounting systems, we need to understand how accounting systems operate in their social, political and economic contexts. The main objectives of this study are to: 1) highlight the Satyam Computers Limited's accounting scandal by por-traying the sequence of events, the aftermath of events, the key parties involved, and major follow-up actions under-taken in India; and 2) what lesions can be learned from Satyam scam?
To complement prior literature, we examined docu-mented behaviors in cases of Satyam corporate scandal, using the evidence taken from press articles, and also applied a "content" analysis to them. In terms of infor-mation collection "methodology", we searched for evidence from the press coverage contained in the "Factiva" database. Thus, present study is primarily based on "sec-ondary" sources of data (EBSCO host database) gathered from the related literature published in the journals, newspaper, books, statements, reports. However, as stated earlier, the nature of study is "primarily qualita-tive, descriptive and analytical". By 2003, Satyam's IT services businesses included 13,120 technical associates servicing over 300 customers worldwide. At that time, the world-wide IT services market was estimated at nearly $400 billion, with an es-timated annual compound growth rate of 6.4%. "The markets major drivers at that point in time were the in-creased importance of IT services to businesses world-wide; the impact of the Internet on eBusiness; the emer-gence of a high-quality IT services industry in India and their methodologies; and, the growing need of IT ser-vices providers who could provide a range of services". To effectively compete, both against domestic and global competitors, the company embarked on a variety of multi-pronged business growth strategies. . It also appeared that the cash that the company raised through American Depository Receipts in the United States never made it to the balance sheets. Greed for money, power, competition, success and prestige compelled Mr. Raju to "ride the tiger", which led to violation of all duties imposed on them as fiduciaries-the duty of care, the duty of negligence, the duty of loyalty, the duty of disclosure towards the stakeholders. "The Satyam scandal is a classic case of negligence of fiduciary duties, total collapse of ethical standards, and a lack of corporate social responsibility. It is human greed and desire that led to fraud. This type of behavior can be traced to: greed overshadowing the responsibility to meet fiduciary duties; fierce competition and the need to im-press stakeholders especially investors, analysts, shareholders, and the stock market; low ethical and moral standards by top management; and, greater emphasis on short-term performance" [28] . According to CBI, the In-dian crime investigation agency, the fraud activity dates back from April 1999, when the company embarked on a road to double-digit annual growth. Raju claimed in the same letter that "neither he nor the managing director had benefited financially from the inflated revenues, and none of the board members had any knowledge of the situation in which the company was placed". The fraud took place to divert company funds into real-estate investment, keep high earnings per share, raise executive compensation, and make huge profits by selling stake at inflated price. The gap in the balance sheet had arisen purely on account of inflated profits over a period that lasted several years starting in April 1999. "What accounted as a marginal gap between actual operating profit and the one reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow over the years. This gap reached unmanageable proportions as company opera-tions grew significantly", Ragu explained in his letter to the board and shareholders. He went on to explain, "Every attempt to eliminate the gap failed, and the aborted Maytas acquisition deal was the last attempt to fill the fictitious assets with real ones. But the investors thought it was a brazen attempt to siphon cash out of Satyam, in which the Raju family held a small stake, into firms the family held tightly". Table 1 depicts some parts of the Satyam's fabricated 'Balance Sheet and Income Statement' and shows the "difference" between "actual" and "reported" finances.
Corporate Accounting Scandal at
Fortunately, the Satyam deal with Matyas was "sal-vageable". It could have been saved only if "the deal had been allowed to go through, as Satyam would have been able to use Maytas' assets to shore up its own books". Raju, who showed "artificial" cash on his books, had planned to use this "non-existent" cash to acquire the two Maytas companies. As part of their "tunneling" strategy, the Satyam promoters had substantially reduced their holdings in company from 25.6% in March 2001 to 8.74% in March 2008. Furthermore, as the promoters held a very small percentage of equity (mere 2.18%) on December 2008, as shown in Table 2 , the concern was that poor performance would result in a takeover bid, thereby exposing the gap. It was like "riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off without being eaten". The aborted Maytas acquisition deal was the final, desperate effort to cover up the accounting fraud by bringing some real assets into the business. When that failed, Raju con-fessed the fraud. Given the stake the Rajus held in Mat-yas, pursuing the deal would not have been terribly dif-ficult from the perspective of the Raju family. Unlike Enron, which sank due to agency problem, Satyam was brought to its knee due to tunneling. The company with a huge cash pile, with promoters still controlling it with a small per cent of shares (less than 3%), and trying to ab-sorb a real-estate company in which they have a majority stake is a deadly combination pointing prima facie to tunneling [30] . The reason why Ramalinga Raju claims that he did it was because every year he was fudging revenue figures and since expenditure figures could not be fudged so easily, the gap between "actual" profit and "book" profit got widened every year. In order to close this gap, he had to buy Maytas Infrastructure and Maytas Properties. In this way, "fictitious" profits could be ab-sorbed through a "self-dealing" process. The auditors, bankers, and SEBI, the market watchdog, were all blamed for their role in the accounting fraud. 
The Auditors Role and Factors Contributing to Fraud
Global auditing firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), audited Satyam's books from June 2000 until the discov-ery of the fraud in 2009. Several commentators criticized PwC harshly for failing to detect the fraud. Indeed, PwC signed Satyam's financial statements and was responsible for the numbers under the Indian law. One particularly troubling item concerned the $1.04 billion that Satyam claimed to have on its balance sheet in "non-interest-bearing" deposits. According to accounting professionals, "any reasonable company would have either invested the money into an interest-bearing account, or returned the excess cash to the shareholders. The large amount of cash thus should have been a 'red-flag' for the auditors that further verification and testing was necessary. Further-more, it appears that the auditors did not independently verify with the banks in which Satyam claimed to have deposits". Additionally, the Satyam fraud went on for a number of years and involved both the manipulation of balance sheets and income statements. Whenever Satyam needed more income to meet analyst estimates, it simply created "fictitious" sources and it did so numerous times, without the auditors ever discovering the fraud. Suspiciously, Satyam also paid PwC twice what other firms would charge for the audit, which raises questions about whether PwC was complicit in the fraud. Furthermore, PwC au-dited the company for nearly 9 years and did not uncover the fraud, whereas Merrill Lynch discovered the fraud as part of its due diligence in merely 10 days. Missing these "red-flags" implied either that the auditors were grossly inept or in collusion with the company in committing the fraud. PWC initially asserted that it performed all of the company's audits in accordance with applicable auditing standards. Numerous factored contributed to the Satyam fraud. The independent board members of Satyam, the institu-tional investor community, the SEBI, retail investors, and the external auditor-none of them, including profes-sional investors with detailed information and models available to them, detected the malfeasance. The follow-ing is a list of factors that contributed to the fraud: greed, ambitious corporate growth, deceptive reporting prac-tices-lack of transparency, excessive interest in main-taining stock prices, executive incentives, stock market expectations, nature of accounting rules, ESOPs issued to those who prepared fake bills, high risk deals that went sour, audit failures (internal and external), aggressiveness of investment and commercial banks, rating agencies and investors, weak independent directors and audit commit-tee, and whistle-blower policy not being effective.
Aftermath of Satyam Scandal
Immediately following the news of the fraud, Merrill Lynch terminated its engagement with Satyam, Credit Suisse suspended its coverage of Satyam, and Pricewa-terhouseCoopers (PwC) came under intense scrutiny and its license to operate was revoked. Coveted awards won by Satyam and its executive management were stripped from the company. Satyam's shares fell to 11.50 rupees on January 10, 2009, their lowest level since March 1998, compared to a high of 544 rupees in 2008. In the New York Stock Exchange, Satyam shares peaked in 2008 at US $ 29.10; by March 2009 they were trading around US $1.80. Thus, investors lost $2.82 billion in Satyam. Un-fortunately, Satyam significantly inflated its earnings and assets for years and rolling down Indian stock markets and throwing the industry into turmoil [31] . Criminal charges were brought against Mr. Raju, including: criminal conspiracy, breach of trust, and forgery. After the Satyam fiasco and the role played by PwC, investors became wary of those companies who are clients of PwC, which resulted in fall in share prices of around 100 com-panies varying between 5% -15%. The news of the scandal (quickly compared with the collapse of Enron) sent jitters through the Indian stock market, and the benchmark Sensex index fell more than 5%. Shares in Satyam fell more than 70%. The chart Immediately after Raju's revelation about the ac-counting fraud, "new" board members were appointed and they started working towards a solution that would prevent the total collapse of the firm. Indian officials acted quickly to try to save Satyam from the same fate that met Enron and WorldCom, when they experienced large accounting scandals. The Indian government "im-mediately started an investigation, while at the same time limiting its direct participation, with Satyam because it did not want to appear like it was responsible for the fraud, or attempting to cover up the fraud". The govern-ment appointed a "new" board of directors for Satyam to try to save the company. The Board's goal was "to sell the company within 100 days". To devise a plan of sale, the board met with bankers, accountants, lawyers, and gov-ernment officials immediately. It worked diligently to bring stability and confidence back to the company to ensure the sale of the company within the 100-day time frame. To accomplish the sale, the board hired Goldman Sachs and Avendus Capital and charged them with selling the company in the shortest time possible.
By mid-March, several major players in the IT field had gained enough confidence in Satyam's operations to par-ticipate in an auction process for Satyam. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) appointed a retired Supreme Court Justice, Justice Bharucha, to oversee the process and instill confidence in the transaction. Several companies bid on Satyam on April 13, 2009. The winning bidder, Tech Mahindra, bought Satyam for $1.13 per share-less than a third of its stock market value before Mr. Raju revealed the fraud-and salvaged its operations [32] . Both Tech Mahindra and the SEBI are now fully aware of the full extent of the fraud and India will not pursue further investigations. The stock has again stabi-lized from its fall on November 26, 2009 and, as part of Tech Mahindra, Saytam is once again on its way toward a bright future.
Investigation: Criminal and Civil Charges
The investigation that followed the revelation of the fraud has led to charges against several different groups of people involved with Satyam. Indian authorities arrested Mr. Raju, Mr. Raju's brother, B. Ramu Raju, its former managing director, Srinivas Vdlamani, the company's head of internal audit, and its CFO on criminal charges of fraud. Indian authorities also arrested and charged several of the company's auditors (PwC) with fraud. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India [33] ruled that "the CFO and the auditor were guilty of professional misconduct". The CBI is also in the course of investigating the CEO's overseas assets. There were also several civil charges filed in the US against Satyam by the holders of its ADRs. The investigation also implicated several Indian politicians. Both civil and criminal litigation cases con-tinue in India and civil litigation continues in the United States. Some of the main victims were: employees, clients, shareholders, bankers and Indian government.
In the aftermath of Satyam, India's markets recovered and Satyam now lives on. India's stock market is currently trading near record highs, as it appears that a global eco-nomic recovery is taking place. Civil litigation and criminal charges continue against Satyam. Tech Mahindra purchased 51% of Satyam on April 16, 2009, successfully saving the firm from a complete collapse. With the right changes, India can minimize the rate and size of ac-counting fraud in the Indian capital markets.
Corporate Governance Issues at Satyam
On a quarterly basis, Satyam earnings grew. Mr. Raju admitted that the fraud which he committed amounted to nearly $276 million. In the process, Satyam grossly vio-lated all rules of corporate governance [34] . The Satyam scam had been the example for following "poor" CG practices. It had failed to show good relation with the shareholders and employees. CG issue at Satyam arose because of non-fulfillment of obligation of the company towards the various stakeholders. Of specific interest are the following: distinguishing the roles of board and management; separation of the roles of the CEO and chairman; appointment to the board; directors and execu-tive compensation; protection of shareholders rights and their executives.
Lessons Learned from Satyam Scam
The 2009 Satyam scandal in India highlighted the ne-farious potential of an improperly governed corporate leader. As the fallout continues, and the effects were felt throughout the global economy, the prevailing hope is that some good can come from the scandal in terms of lessons learned [35] . Here are some lessons learned from the Satyam Scandal:
Investigate All Inaccuracies: The fraud scheme at Satyam started very small, eventually growing into $276 million white-elephant in the room. Indeed, a lot of fraud schemes initially start out small, with the perpetrator thinking that small changes here and there would not make a big difference, and is less likely to be detected. This sends a message to a lot of com-panies: if your accounts are not balancing, or if something seems inaccurate (even just a tiny bit), it is worth investigating. Dividing responsibilities across a team of people makes it easier to detect irregularities or misappropriated funds.
Ruined Reputations: Fraud does not just look bad on a company; it looks bad on the whole industry and a country. "India's biggest corporate scandal in memory threatens future foreign investment flows into Asia's third largest economy and casts a cloud over growth in its once-booming outsourcing sector. The news sent Indian equity markets into a tail-spin, with Bombay's main benchmark index tumbling 7.3% and the Indian rupee fell". Now, because of the Satyam scandal, Indian rivals will come under greater scrutiny by the regulators, investors and customers.
Corporate Governance Needs to Be Stronger: The Satyam case is just another example supporting the need for stronger CG. All public-companies must be careful when selecting executives and top-level managers. These are the people who set the tone for the company: if there is corruption at the top, it is bound to trickle-down. Also, separate the role of CEO and Chairman of the Board. Splitting up the roles, thus, helps avoid situations like the one at Satyam.
The Satyam Computer Services' scandal brought to light the importance of ethics and its relevance to corpo-rate culture. The fraud committed by the founders of Satyam is a testament to the fact that "the science of conduct" is swayed in large by human greed, ambition, and hunger for power, money, fame and glory.
Conclusions
Recent corporate frauds and the outcry for transparency and honesty in reporting have given rise to two outcomes. First, forensic accounting skills have become very crucial in untangling the complicated accounting maneuvers that have obfuscated financial statements. Second, public demand for change and subsequent regulatory action has transformed CG scenario across the globe. In fact, both these trends have the common goal of addressing the investors' concerns about the transparent financial re-porting system. The failure of the corporate communication structure, therefore, has made the financial commu-nity realize that "there is a great need for skilled profes-sionals that can identify, expose, and prevent structural weaknesses in three key areas: poor corporate govern-ance, flawed internal controls, and fraudulent financial statements [36] . In addition, the CG framework needs to be first of all strengthened and then implemented in "let-ter as well as in right spirit". The increasing rate of white-collar crimes, without doubt, demands stiff penal-ties and punishments.
Perhaps, no financial fraud had a greater impact on accounting and auditing profession than Enron, World-Com, and recently, India's Enron: "Satyam". All these frauds have led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002, and a new federal agency and financial standard-setting body, the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). It also was the impetus for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) adoption of SAS No. 99, "Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit" [37] . But it may be that the greatest impact of Enron and WorldCom was in the significant increased focus and awareness related to fraud. It establishes external auditors' responsibility to plan and perform audits to provide a reasonable assur-ance that the audited financial statements are free of ma-terial frauds.
As part of this research study, one of the key objectives was "to examine and analyze in-depth the Satyam Com-puters Limited's accounting scandal by portraying the sequence of events, the aftermath of events, the key par-ties involved, major reforms undertaken in India, and learn some lessons from it". Unlike Enron, which sank due to "agency" problem, Satyam was brought to its knee due to "tunneling". The Satyam scandal highlights the importance of securities laws and CG in emerging mar-kets. There is a broad consensus that emerging market countries must strive to create a regulatory environment in their securities markets that fosters effective CG. India has managed its transition into a global economy well, and although it suffers from CG issues, it is not alone as both developed countries and emerging countries ex-perience accounting and CG scandals. The Satyam scan-dal brought to light, once again, the importance of ethics and its relevance to corporate culture. The fraud com-mitted by the founders of Satyam is a testament to the fact that "the science of conduct is swayed in large by human greed, ambition, and hunger for power, money, fame and glory". All kind of scandals/frauds have proven that there is a need for good conduct based on strong ethics. The Indian government, in Satyam case, took very quick actions to protect the interest of the investors, safeguard the credibility of India, and the nation's image across the world. Moreover, Satyam fraud has forced the government to re-write CG rules and tightened the norms for auditors and accountants. The Indian affiliate of PwC "routinely failed to follow the most basic audit proce-dures. The SEC and the PCAOB fined the affiliate, PwC India, $7.5 million which was described as the largest American penalty ever against a foreign accounting firm" [38] . According to President, ICAI (January 25, 2011), "The Satyam scam was not an accounting or auditing failure, but one of CG. This apex body had found the two PWC auditors prima-facie guilty of professional misconduct". The CBI, which investigated the Satyam fraud case, also charged the two auditors with "complicity in the commission of the fraud by consciously overlooking the accounting irregularities". The culture at Satyam, especially dominated by the board, symbolized an unethical culture. On one hand, his rise to stardom in the corporate world, coupled with immense pressure to impress investors, made Mr. Raju a "compelled leader to deliver outstanding results". On the contrary, Mr. Raju had to suppress his own morals and values in favor of the greater good of the company. The board connived with his actions and stood as a blind spectator; the lure of big compensation to members fur-ther encouraged such behavior. But, in the end, truth is sought and those violating the legal, ethical, and societal norms are taken to task as per process of law. The public confession of fraud by Mr. Ramalinga Raju speaks of integrity still left in him as an individual. His acceptance of guilt and blame for the whole fiasco shows a bright spot of an otherwise "tampered" character. After quitting as Satyam's Chairman, Raju said, "I am now prepared to subject myself to the laws of land and face consequences thereof". Mr. Raju had many ethical dilemmas to face, but his persistent immoral reasoning brought his own demise. The fraud finally had to end and the implications were having far reaching consequences. Thus, Satyam scam was not an accounting or auditing failure, but one of CG. Undoubtedly, the government of India took prompt actions to protect the interest of the investors and safeguard the credibility of India and the nation's image across the world. In addition, the CG framework needs to be strengthened, implemented both in "letter as well as in right spirit", and enforced vigorously to curb white-collar crimes. Company" 6 years in a row prior to the scandal.
